SARS in Hospital Emergency Room by Chen, Yee-Chun et al.
Thirty-one cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) occurred after exposure in the emergency room at
the National Taiwan University Hospital. The index patient
was linked to an outbreak at a nearby municipal hospital.
Three clusters were identified over a 3-week period. The
first cluster (5 patients) and the second cluster (14 patients)
occurred among patients, family members, and nursing
aids. The third cluster (12 patients) occurred exclusively
among healthcare workers. Six healthcare workers had
close contact with SARS patients. Six others, with different
working patterns, indicated that they did not have contact
with a SARS patient. Environmental surveys found 9 of 119
samples of inanimate objects to be positive for SARS coro-
navirus RNA. These observations indicate that although
transmission by direct contact with known SARS patients
was responsible for most cases, environmental contamina-
tion with the SARS coronavirus may have lead to infection
among healthcare workers without documented contact
with known hospitalized SARS patients.
T
he coronavirus responsible for the severe acute respi-
ratory syndrome (SARS-CoV) rapidly spread from
Mainland China to 30 countries worldwide (1–4). From
November 1, 2002, through July 31, 2003, a total of 8,098
probable cases were reported, including 346 from Taiwan
(2). The disease is of great concern because of the high
case-fatality rate, short incubation period, rapid spread
along international air routes, and the large number of
cases in previously healthy hospital staff (1,2,5–7). SARS
appears to be spread most commonly by close person-to-
person contact through exposure to infectious droplets and
possibly by direct contact with infected body fluids
(1,5–7). Emerging evidence indicates that SARS can be
acquired from contaminated inanimate objects in the envi-
ronment (8).
Taiwan is geographically close to China and Hong
Kong and has a population of 23 million. An outbreak
began on April 23, 2003, at a municipal hospital (hospital
A) in Taipei. The index patient had unrecognized SARS.
Multiple patients, visitors, and healthcare workers were
exposed to this patient (9). After the outbreak at hospital A,
patients sought care at the National Taiwan University
Hospital, and patients with febrile illness screened in the
emergency room (ER) increased substantially. 
On May 8, 2003, we identified and reported to the local
health department three SARS cases in patients whose
only contact history was being treated at the National
Taiwan University Hospital ER. Source and contact trac-
ing failed to identify the index patient. In response to this
outbreak, we admitted all ER patients in phases to a spe-
cial unit where droplet and contact precautions were
implemented, and on May 12, 2003, the operation of the
ER was suspended. 
On the same day, the infection control team was
informed that three healthcare workers who worked in the
ER had fever. They were immediately isolated, and initial
interviews with the healthcare workers failed to identify a
common source of infection. To better understand the
mode of transmission, we conducted this epidemiologic
study and environmental surveillance by using a highly
sensitive and specific assay for SARS-CoV RNA. We
describe how we traced the index patient to hospital A and
the subsequent occurrence of three clusters of SARS after
exposure to the National Taiwan University Hospital ER.
We also provide evidence for indirect-contact transmission
among some of the healthcare workers on the basis of the
environmental studies.
Materials and Methods
Hospital Setting 
The National Taiwan University Hospital is a 2,400-bed
teaching hospital that provides both primary and tertiary
care. National Taiwan University Hospital is located in
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Wang, Cheng-Hsiang Hsiao, and Po-Ren Hsueh.downtown Taipei not far from hospital A. The ER is organ-
ized into several sections, including triage, examination,
observation, critical care, and a clean area reserved for
staff activities. A SARS screening unit was established on
March 17, 2003, to interview and triage febrile patients
with suspected cases of SARS. The patients were ques-
tioned about the presence of fever, myalgia, gastrointesti-
nal or respiratory symptoms, whether they had close
contact with a SARS patient, and recent travel. N95 respi-
rators were placed on patients suspected to have SARS
early during the triage process, and they were immediate-
ly placed in private rooms (SARS area) to avoid contact
with others in the ER. Adaily record was maintained of all
patients screened in the SARS screening unit. SARS cases
were defined according to the World Health Organization
criteria (10), modified to expand the definition of contact
to include any healthcare setting with nosocomial trans-
mission.
Infection-Control Measures
Since March 14, 2003, infection-control measures
required that all healthcare workers who had contact with
patients with SARS use personal protective equipments,
including gown, gloves, N95 respirators, disposable cap,
and shoe covers. Later, a face shield was included for
healthcare workers with close contact to SARS patients. 
Healthcare workers who had any contact with SARS
patients or their environment were placed under surveil-
lance for 14 days after the last exposure. Those who had
unprotected exposure, or those who were protected but had
high-risk exposures to SARS patients were excluded from
new duty assignments and were restricted from direct
patient care and contact with other healthcare workers.
Any healthcare worker in whom fever developed was
placed in specially designated isolation wards.
Infection-control measures in the non-SARS area were
upgraded stepwise in response to possible healthcare-asso-
ciated transmission and the increasing possibility of com-
munity spread of SARS. After the outbreak in hospital A,
healthcare workers wore N95 respirators for all patient care
in the ER. In the ER, SARS areas were cleaned at least
three times; non-SARS areas were cleaned once a day.
Identifying Cases and Sources of Exposure
We obtained source and contact information for all
patients identified at our hospital as having suspected or
probable SARS. After the outbreak in hospital A, health
insurance records were used to trace prior visits to other
hospitals. In addition, we obtained information about
social, hospital, and occupational contacts and other mem-
bers of the household who had been exposed to suspected
SARS patients within 10 days before the onset of their
symptoms. All close contacts exposed to SARS patients
during the period from 2 days before the onset of fever to
the time of isolation were traced to identify the need for
quarantine. Inpatients who had close contact with SARS
patients were quarantined in private rooms, and contact
and droplet precautions were implemented. On April 30,
because of the occurrence of two closely spaced cases of
SARS in the ER observation unit (a non-SARS area), we
immediately identified a potential outbreak. Accordingly,
we screened all inpatients that had been admitted through
the ER and telephoned all the patients who stayed in the
observation unit from April 23 through April 29.
Soon after the cluster of SARS was identified among
healthcare workers on May 12, we devised a questionnaire
to identify the source and the factors contributing to infec-
tion. Data about daily exposures were collected from April
30 through May 12, 2003. These data included contact
with SARS patients; work areas; day, time, and character-
istics of duty; exposure to high-risk aerosol-generating
procedures; use of personal protective equipment; hand
hygiene practices; and contact with other healthcare work-
ers who did not use N95 respirators. 
Environmental Survey
On May 15, surfaces of environment and equipment
were sampled with moistened sterile cotton swabs. The
swabs were spread immediately onto 3 mL of viral trans-
port medium. Samples were collected from various objects
in different areas of ER.
Air samples were taken with both high-volume and
low-volume samplers in 10 locations in the ER. We used a
high-volume air sampler (XMX Virtual Impactor, Dycor
Technologies Ltd., Alberta, Canada) to draw air at calibrat-
ed sampling rates of 400 L per min for 5 min into a collec-
tor with 5 mL of phosphate-buffered saline (PBS). We also
used a low-volume pump (Sidekick, SKC Inc., Eighty
Four, PA) to draw air at a calibrated sampling rate of 2.0 L
per min for 10 h onto a 37-mm diameter, 0.3-µm pore size
polytetrafluoroethylene membrane filters. The collected
samples were then frozen at –70°C before RNAextraction.
Once environmental contamination was identified, clean-
ing was performed. Follow-up surveillance for contami-
nated objects was conducted on May 25.
Viral Molecular Testing
Swab samples were suspended in 5 mL of PBS or 3 mL
of viral transport medium. Total RNA from 140 µL of the
sample was extracted by using a QIAamp Virus RNAMini
Kit (Qiagen, Hilden, Germany) and eluted in 60 µLo f
buffer. A volume of 5 µL of RNA solution was analyzed.
RealArt HPA-Coronavirus LC RT-PCR Reagents (Roche,
Penzberg, Germany) were used for one-step real-time
reverse transcription–polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR)
in the Roche LightCycler Instrument (Roche, Mannheim,
SARS in Hospital Emergency Room
Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 10, No. 5, May 2004 783Germany). This ready-to-use system is designed for spe-
cific amplification of the 80-bp region of the SARS-CoV
genome and for directly detecting the specific amplicon in
fluorimeter channel F1 of the LightCycler Instrument. In
addition, these reagents contain a second heterologous
amplification system to identify possible PCR inhibition.
Internal controls in each run of the experiment included
two negative controls (one for RNAextraction and one for
RT-PCR) and four quantification standards (1 x 101
copies/µL, 1 x 102 copies/µL, 1 x 103 copies/µL, and 1 x
104 copies/µL). We used the following formula to convert
the values determined by using the standard curve into
copies per milliliter of sample material: results
(copies/mL) = result (copies/µL) x elution volume
(µL)/sample volume (mL). Data were presented as number
of copies per sample. 
Results
Identification of Outbreaks in the ER
From March 15 through April 22, a median of 6
patients per day (range 0–29) were screened at the ER for
febrile illnesses (Figure 1). After the outbreak in hospital
A, a median of 36 patients per day (range 21–67) were
screened. Thus, the ER was used to screen a large portion
of persons during this rapidly progressing epidemic. Of
754 patients screened at the ER from April 23 through May
12, a total of 63 patients were identified as SARS cases and
were admitted to National Taiwan University Hospital, 68
SARS patients were transferred to another hospital, and
155 received care in a temporarily designated ER area
because of shortages of isolation rooms and staff. On May
7, up to 18 SARS patients stayed in the ER overnight. Of
232 SARS patients admitted to the National Taiwan
University Hospital from March 14 through June 19, 31
(13.4%) did not have a history of travel, exposure to SARS
patients, or a hospital visit within 10 days before illness,
and the only contact history was a stay at the National
Taiwan University Hospital ER. 
Source and Contact Tracing
We identified three distinct clusters by plotting the
dates of onset of fever for each case (Figure 2) and alloca-
tion of bed numbers in the observation unit of patients
involved (Figure 3). The first cluster of five patients had
disease onset from April 29 through May 1; the second
cluster of 14 cases began on May 4, and the third cluster of
12 cases began on May 11, 2003. In the third cluster, all the
cases were in healthcare workers. The first cluster affected
patients located in three neighboring beds in the observa-
tion unit of the ER (Figure 3). The second cluster affected
patients located in four nearby beds and a fifth bed that
was >3 m away. The distance between beds was approxi-
mately 1 m. None of the cases occurred in beds 9–18,
which are separated by a half wall.
The index patient in the first cluster was an afebrile 73-
year-old man who was admitted to the ER because of
severe dyspnea (Figure 4, 1P). He was kept in the observa-
tion unit from April 23 through April 25, 2003. He was
thought to have congestive heart failure and chronic
obstructive lung disease and treated with aerosolized med-
ication. He was admitted to the cardiology ward on April
25. A temperature of >38°C developed on April 27, and a
chest radiograph taken on the same day indicated a new
infiltrate. He was immediately transferred to a negative-
pressure isolation room. He had not given this history, but
after checking his health insurance card, we learned that he
had visited hospital Aon April 14 and April 15. He died on
April 30. Sputum samples were positive for SARS-CoV
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Figure 1. Time course during which patients with febrile illnesses
were screened for severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
(vertical bars) and patients with SARS were detected at the emer-
gency room of National Taiwan University Hospital, March 15–May
12, 2003. The numbers of patients with SARS who were admitted
to this hospital is shown in black lines. The number of patients who
temporarily stayed in the emergency room or were transferred to
other hospitals is shown in red and blue lines, respectively.
Figure 2. Epidemic curves showing three clusters of cases of
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) during the outbreak at
the emergency room of the National Taiwan University Hospital.
The first two clusters (open bars) consisted of patients, family
members, and nursing aids. The third cluster (solid bars) consist-
ed entirely of healthcare workers.RNA. On autopsy, he was found to have had an acute
myocardial infarction. A small ground-glass density in the
lung was compatible with viral pneumonitis. 
The second patient was another 73-year-old man who
had cough and fever for 2 weeks. He had been treated in
the ER observation unit from April 24 through April 29.
He returned to the ER on April 30 and was diagnosed with
probable SARS. Because of the occurrence of two closely
spaced cases of SARS in the ER observation unit (a non-
SARS area), we immediately identified a potential out-
break. Contact tracing identified a cluster of cases in three
patients and two nursing aids (Table 1, patient 2–6;
Figure 4). All five cases were diagnosed as probable
SARS, and results of three tests were positive for SARS-
CoV RNA. The contacts were quarantined, and no tertiary
cases emerged.
The second cluster began on May 8. A46-year-old, oth-
erwise-healthy woman (patient 8) was admitted with prob-
able SARS. A week earlier she had taken care of her
mother (patient 9) in the ER observation unit. She indicat-
ed that she did not have contact with other SARS patients,
including those identified in the first cluster. Accordingly,
we screened all patients who stayed in the observation unit
from April 30 through May 8. This cluster affected six
patients, three family members, and five nursing aids
(Figures 2 and 4; Table 1, patients 7–20). Patient 17 was
the only tertiary case.
The third cluster was noted on May 12, when the infec-
tion control team was informed that fever developed in
three healthcare workers who had been isolated. The exact
contact source could not be identified. Thus, we quaran-
tined all the ER healthcare workers and suspended ER
operations for 2 weeks. SARS related to the ER developed
in 12 healthcare workers from May 11 through May 16
(Figure 2, solid lines). Six of the healthcare workers who
became ill had close contact with SARS patients.
However, patient contact and time of exposure were differ-
ent. The healthcare workers were one desk clerk, two
physicians, one radiology technician, and two nurses. All
had followed infection-control precautions. Six other
healthcare workers who became ill indicated that they did
not have close contact with SARS patients. These workers
were four nurses and two cleaners. These 12 healthcare
workers differed from each other according to duty pat-
tern, service time, work areas, and time of exposure to the
unit (data not shown). Source and contact tracing failed to
identify a common source. We therefore postulated that
they might have acquired SARS through indirect contact. 
Environmental Survey
On May 15, we collected 119 environment samples,
including 100 surface samples and 19 air samples (Table 2).
Nine samples were positive for SARS-CoV RNA. These
included the buttons of the drinking water fountains in the
triage and the observation unit; a bedside chair in the obser-
vation unit; the outlet of the central air supply, a table top,
bedding and bed edge in a SARS area; and a bookshelf and
bedding in the clean area. None of 19 air samples tested
positive for viral RNA. The highest viral load was obtained
from a bedside chair in the observation unit (2,570 to
25,700 copies per sample). 
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Figure 3. Allocation of bed numbers in the observation unit of
patients involved in the first cluster (squares) and the second clus-
ter (stars) of severe acute respiratory syndrome at the emergency
room (ER) of National Taiwan University Hospital. 
Figure 4. Contact history and temporal relationships among con-
tacts according to the date of fever for 19 cases of severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) during the first two clusters of SARS
at the emergency room of National Taiwan University Hospital. On
April 27, fever and pneumonia developed in the index patient
(patient 1) of the first cluster. The second cluster from an unknown
source was identified on May 8. P, patients. Unlabeled numbers
indicate family members or nursing aids. Location in the emer-
gency room is shown in gray bars and in general wards by black
bars. Numbers within the gray bar represent bed numbers in the
observation unit of the ER. The dates of onset of fever are shown
in arrows.Control Measures and Follow-up 
Targeted cleaning of the ER environment was per-
formed. Follow-up surveillance was conducted on May 25.
Nine samples were collected from previously contaminat-
ed surfaces, 21 samples from other areas in the ER, and 15
samples from SARS wards. All 45 samples were negative
for SARS-CoV RNA. All personnel who had contact with
SARS patients or their environments were reeducated on
infection-control measures. Particular attention was paid to
hand hygiene and routine environmental cleaning. The
workload for healthcare workers was reduced. All patient
beds were placed at least 2 m apart. No further cases of
SARS related to the ER occurred after May 17, 2003.
Discussion
This report describes three clusters of SARS cases
related to exposure to the ER at National Taiwan
University Hospital during the epidemic in Taiwan. The
index patient had been exposed to SARS at a nearby hos-
pital. The patients symptoms were atypical for SARS, and
he initially indicated that he had not been to hospital A. He
had chronic cardiac and pulmonary disease and was
afebrile. To date, healthcare-associated acquisition of
SARS has been reported from eight hospitals in Taiwan
(including National Taiwan University Hospital). All have
been linked to the initial outbreak at hospital A (9).
Unrecognized cases of SARS are probably the most impor-
tant factor that led to intrahospital spread and cases among
healthcare workers (11,12). 
Most patients appear to have acquired their infections
by close patient contact, presumably by droplet transmis-
sion. Six of the cases among the healthcare workers had no
direct SARS patient contact. They may have acquired their
infection from commonly used, contaminated objects.
Finding SARS-CoV RNA in nine commonly used inani-
mate objects supports this notion. Although the signal only
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Table 1. Medical histories and conditions of the index patient and 19 patients affected in the clusters of severe acute respiratory 
syndrome related to the emergency room (ER) of National Taiwan University Hospital 
Patient no.  Age/sex  Characteristics 
Index patient     
1  73/M  Coronary artery disease, recent percutaneous occlusive balloon angioplasty and stenting, congestive heart failure, 
chronic obstructive lung disease, diabetes mellitus, chronic renal insufficiency. Had dyspnea without fever. 
First cluster     
2  73/M  Infarction, hypertension, diabetes mellitus, old cerebral vascular accident, parkinsonism, hyperthyroidism. Cough for 
2 weeks and fever for 1 week and was treated for aspiration pneumonia.   
3   24/F  Nursing aide of patient 2.   
4  62/F  Hepatitis C virus–related cirrhosis of liver, hypertension, diabetes mellitus. Had upper gastrointestinal bleeding. 
5  64/F  Nursing aide of patient 4. Bronchial asthma. 
6  65/F  Common bile duct stone and obstructive jaundice status post endoscopic retrograde cholangiopancreatography and 
endoscopic nasobiliary drainage, gallbladder stone status post cholecystectomy. Had fever and abdominal pain. 
Second cluster     
7  88/M  Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, hypertension, coronary artery disease status post percutaneous transluminal 
coronary angiography. Had lower intestinal bleeding secondary to ischemic colitis. 
8  46/F  Family member of patient 9. 
9  71/F  Acute pancreatitis, diarrhea. 
10  65/F  Coronary artery disease status post percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty, major depression, diabetes 
mellitus, hypertension, end-stage renal disease under regular hemodialysis at a regional hospital. Persistent fever, 
diarrhea, leukocytosis, and normal chest radiograph result. 
11  63/F  Took care of her son with acute pancreatitis in the ER. 
12  38/M  Took care of his mother with end-stage renal disease undergoing hemodialysis. Stayed in the ER for 2 hours on April 
29. Fever developed on May 7. Chest radograph findings were abnormal on May 11. 
13  48/F  Nursing aide of a patient with pancreatitis close to patient 10 who had frequent diarrhea. She helped take care of 
patient 10. 
14  43/F  Nursing aide of patient 10. 
15  24/F  Nursing aide of a patient who visited the ER on May 2. 
16  46/F  Pancreatic cancer with liver metastasis, perforated gastric ulcer status post primary closure and duodenostomy, 
gastrostomy and jejunostomy, poor control of diabetes mellitus and hypertension, glaucoma. Abdominal pain and 
watery diarrhea and was diagnosed as adhesion ileus and subcutaneous abscess caused by Klebsiella pneumoniae. 
17  43/F  Nursing aide. Contact of patient 9. Colon tubular adenoma status post polypectomy, chronic paranasal sinusitis status 
post functional endoscopic sinus surgery. 
18  28/M  Tinea pedis, cellulitis. 
19  69/M  Coronary artery disease, status post percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty. Abdominal discomfort and loss 
of appetite for several weeks. Cholangiocarcinoma, obstructive jaundice, biliary tract infection, and upper 
gastrointestinal bleeding were diagnosed. 
20  28/F  Nursing aide. demonstrated SARS-CoV RNA and not viable virus, this
finding may indicate that the virus can persist in the envi-
ronment.
Environmental contamination was first demonstrated
during a community outbreak in Hong Kong (13). The
SARS virus may be stable in the environment at room tem-
perature for 1 to 2 days (8). It can survive on plastic sur-
faces, stainless steel, glass slides, and paper files. The virus
can survive even longer (up to 4 days) in stool from
patients with diarrhea (8). In some series, diarrhea is a
common complaint of SARS patients (14). One patient
(patient 2) in the first cluster had intestinal bleeding, and 4
of 14 patients in the second cluster had diarrhea. 
Overcrowding in the ER during an epidemic creates
more opportunities for cross transmission and environ-
mental contamination. In addition, overworked medical
staff may not follow preventive procedures and take inad-
equate precautions (15,16). After the outbreak in hospital
A, healthcare workers in the ER wore N–95 respirators for
all patient care. Using protective equipment may account
for the absence of cases among healthcare workers during
the first and the second clusters of SARS in the ER.
However, the third cluster included six healthcare workers
who were not exposed to patients with SARS. Thus, masks
do not prevent acquisition from environmental sources.
Furthermore, the spread of SARS was most likely facilitat-
ed by lack of proper handwashing than by direct contact
with patients or environments contaminated with viral
nucleic acids. Therefore, intensive environmental cleaning
should be instituted as soon as a case is identified, particu-
larly for those with diarrhea. In addition, the importance of
handwashing cannot be overemphasized. 
This study has several limitations. Comprehensive
serologic surveys were not conducted among all of the
healthcare workers and patients during the outbreak. We
may have missed persons with subclinical or mild infec-
tions who might have transmitted SARS by person-to-per-
son contact. Viral cultures were not performed on samples
taken from inanimate objects. SARS virus detected by RT-
PCR may not have been viable.
Epidemiologic data suggest that transmission of SARS
is mainly through close contact with droplets or secretions.
But increasingly epidemiologic evidence, including this
report, shows that the disease may also be transmitted indi-
rectly through contact with hands or objects contaminated
with secretions or excreta from patients with diarrhea.
Clarifying the route of transmission will help prevent
nosocomial transmission and allay fears that protection is
inadequate. 
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